Paul's Down-Home Page

Col. John Boyd, USAF, is one of the greatest military minds you’ve never heard of. Coram has written a supremely readable hybrid: it’s a biography and an entry-level introduction to Boyd’s two most seminal innovations: the energy-maneuverability theory (which quantified the previously ad-hoc business of air combat maneuvering) and the OODA loop, the first real practical explanation of the theory of maneuver warfare. Boyd’s theories– and his hard-fought efforts to publicize and prove them– gave us the F-15, the F-16, and the Marine Corps’ amphibious feint in the first Gulf War. As a man, Boyd was unyielding, incredibly stubborn, uncouth, profane, and more than a bit eccentric. He was a poor officer in most respects; he hated (and that’s not too strong a word) anyone who he perceived as having put expediency over accuracy, and he was more or less forced out of the Air Force as the result of the cumulative effect of all the impolitic things he said and did (and there were plenty!) At least the way Coram tells it, Boyd was also a terrible husband and father. In fact, the accounts of how indifferent this otherwise brilliant man was toward his wife and children to my mind diminished his stature considerably. A little more consideration and interpersonal skill could have made his life and career much more pleasant for everyone involved. However, that lack doesn’t reduce the scope of what Boyd did, and Coram tells the story with flair. There’s enough detail on E-M theory and the OODA loop to introduce them without overwhelming people who aren’t fighter pilots or military strategists; Coram also suggests several follow-up references that I’m digging into as time allows. Highly recommended. One final note: Boyd was also a Georgia Tech graduate. Go Jackets!

Evan Wright must have been crazy: he went into Iraq with the First Recon Battalion of the US Marine Corps’ First Marine Division, then wrote a book about his experience. Wright does a terrific job of portraying the men in the unit: although they are highly skilled, they are also (for the most part) young, and they have a wide range of opinions about where they are and what they’re doing. Wright finds the same Marine Corps archetypes in First Recon that most of us are familiar with: the steely-eyed stone killer; the rebel who joins the military one step ahead of the law; the pretty-boy whose physical beauty belies his killer instinct; the dumb officer. He does a marvelous job of portraying both the terror of combat and its aftermath, particularly in his exposition of the few occasions when the team he was with accidentally killed noncombatants. My primary complaint about the book is that Wright portrays the battalion commander, and most of his subordinate officers, as buffoons (which is why two of them, “Captain America” and “Encino Man” get nicknames). To be sure, this is a welcome contrast to Atkinson’s book, but it’s hard to believe that the officers of such an elite unit are really such rockheads. Nonetheless, I recommend this book highly.

Of the several books I’ve read on the Iraq war, I’d have to say this one is the best pure military history. The authors have an extensive military background (both were infantry officers in Vietnam; Smith retired from the Marine Corps as a major general, and West is a former assistant secretary of defense whose son Owen is a Force Recon officer). Their plan was fairly simple: they showed up in Kuwait and wangled permission to ride north with 1st Marine Division units, then they wrote about what they saw. This includes the good (the capture of the critical Az Zubayr pumping station on D+1 by two squads of riflemen) and the bad (Col Joe Dowdy’s indecisive use of RCT1, which eventually led to his relief). Along the way, West and Smith do an excellent job of outlining the tactical actions taken by 1st MARDIV units. This is something that was completely missing from Atkinson’s otherwise excellent book. As you might expect, the authors also do an impressive job of characterizing the ordinary Marines they come into contact with, but they do spent a fair amount of time with Major General James Mattis, the 1st Division commander. Their focus on him, though, revolves much more around his tactical and strategic decisions, without much of the touchy-feely philosophizing that characterizes some of Atkinson’s writing about Petraeus. One complaint I have about The March Up is that it skips over some critical details– the battle for An Nasiriyah gets short shrift, and there have been several complaints from participants in the battle (notably this one) that West and Smith got some critical details wrong. That isn’t surprising, given that this book was published very soon after Baghdad fell. It’s an interesting and engaging read (and the excellent color photos in the center are an extremely nice addition).
(Bonus Marine joke here.)